{ "schema_version": 1, "builder_plan": { "scenario": "An agent reads external documents or tool responses that may contain malicious instructions.", "change": "Replay attacks and legitimate lookalikes in an isolated copy of your agent workflow.", "baseline": "Your existing checks with the same tasks, permissions, and tool responses.", "steps": [ "Locate the paper's implementation and check its license, model support, data needs, and hardware requirements. Stop here if you cannot obtain the required artifacts.", "Save a small set of representative product tasks and expected outcomes. Keep evaluation tasks out of any training or tuning, and choose quality and cost limits before running.", "Run the baseline and the proposed change on identical inputs. Keep other settings fixed and repeat paired runs to expose variation.", "Save per-task outputs, failures, timings, and all usage costs. Review regressions before expanding the test." ], "measure": "Successful attacks missed, legitimate actions blocked, detection delay, and review cost.", "decision": "Keep the change only if it meets your preselected quality and latency limits and improves the metric you care about after setup and operating costs. Otherwise retain the baseline. This is an exploration plan, not a validated recommendation." }, "builder_review": null, "arxiv_id": "2610.20960", "title": "StepSafe: Learning Timely Intervention with Context-Aware Safety Reasoning", "summary": "The method replaces post-hoc trajectory-level safety assessment with a step-level guardrail trained via prefix-aligned credit assignment and self-distilled reasoning feedback, so interventions occur while harm is still avertible. 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