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Review regressions before expanding the test." ], "measure": "Successful attacks missed, legitimate actions blocked, detection delay, and review cost.", "decision": "Keep the change only if it meets your preselected quality and latency limits and improves the metric you care about after setup and operating costs. Otherwise retain the baseline. This is an exploration plan, not a validated recommendation." }, "builder_review": null, "arxiv_id": "2610.20776", "title": "INFUSE: A Unified Surface Benchmark for Indirect Prompt Injection in Agentic Systems", "summary": "INFUSE replaces ad hoc or single-turn prompt-injection tests with a 40-task, 56-attack benchmark that evaluates injection across full long-horizon agent trajectories including shell, code, and remote-service surfaces. The cost is evaluation compute (thousands of trajectories) and, if the prompt-hardening mitigation is adopted, a model-dependent security-utility trade-off that can degrade benign task performance. 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