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Review regressions before expanding the test." ], "measure": "Agreement with human review, missed failures, false alarms, and evaluation cost per task.", "decision": "Keep the change only if it meets your preselected quality and latency limits and improves the metric you care about after setup and operating costs. Otherwise retain the baseline. This is an exploration plan, not a validated recommendation." }, "builder_review": null, "arxiv_id": "2610.12757", "title": "MADS: Multi-Agent Dialog Simulation for Robust Conversational Agents", "summary": "MADS replaces hand-collected or purely cooperative dialogue corpora with a multi-agent simulation pipeline that injects adversarial user behavior, plus an associated benchmark (six domains, 55 personas, 1095 conversations, ~66% failure-prone trajectories) for training and evaluating tool-calling agents. 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