{
  "schema_version": 1,
  "builder_plan": {
    "scenario": "An agent reads external documents or tool responses that may contain malicious instructions.",
    "change": "Replay attacks and legitimate lookalikes in an isolated copy of your agent workflow.",
    "baseline": "Your existing checks with the same tasks, permissions, and tool responses.",
    "steps": [
      "Locate the paper's implementation and check its license, model support, data needs, and hardware requirements. Stop here if you cannot obtain the required artifacts.",
      "Save a small set of representative product tasks and expected outcomes. Keep evaluation tasks out of any training or tuning, and choose quality and cost limits before running.",
      "Run the baseline and the proposed change on identical inputs. Keep other settings fixed and repeat paired runs to expose variation.",
      "Save per-task outputs, failures, timings, and all usage costs. Review regressions before expanding the test."
    ],
    "measure": "Successful attacks missed, legitimate actions blocked, detection delay, and review cost.",
    "decision": "Keep the change only if it meets your preselected quality and latency limits and improves the metric you care about after setup and operating costs. Otherwise retain the baseline. This is an exploration plan, not a validated recommendation."
  },
  "builder_review": null,
  "arxiv_id": "2610.12445",
  "title": "Caught in the Act: Probes Effectively Detect Sabotage and Catch Unverbalized Deception",
  "summary": "The method replaces black-box text-based monitoring of agent transcripts (e.g., a strong LLM reading outputs) with white-box linear probes trained on internal activations, using the released FIBS dataset and a multi-layer, multi-token aggregation architecture. Costs include capturing and storing intermediate-layer activations during inference, training and maintaining the probes, and the restriction that the monitored model must be self-hosted open-weight, since API-only models expose no activations. It can fail through distribution shift between the FIBS training distribution and the reader's deployed behaviors, elevated false-positive rates in production traffic, and probes trained on one model likely not transferring to a different model or version without retraining.",
  "rationale": "A small team running open-weight models can train and validate probes on the released dataset at modest cost, but real-world false-positive rates and transfer to their specific model and workload require validation before production reliance.",
  "technique": "Activation probes for deception and sabotage detection",
  "family": "seguranca_e_guardrails",
  "recommendation": "testar",
  "published": "2026-10-08",
  "as_of": "2026-10-18",
  "editorial_status": "indexed",
  "source_url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.12445",
  "independent_implementations": 2,
  "total_implementations": 2,
  "stars": 1,
  "citations": null,
  "claims": [
    {
      "claim_id": "claim-01",
      "statement": "The method replaces black-box text-based monitoring of agent transcripts (e.g., a strong LLM reading outputs) with white-box linear probes trained on internal activations, using the released FIBS dataset and a multi-layer, multi-token aggregation architecture. Costs include capturing and storing intermediate-layer activations during inference, training and maintaining the probes, and the restriction that the monitored model must be self-hosted open-weight, since API-only models expose no activations. It can fail through distribution shift between the FIBS training distribution and the reader's deployed behaviors, elevated false-positive rates in production traffic, and probes trained on one model likely not transferring to a different model or version without retraining.",
      "basis": "inferred",
      "result": "",
      "baseline": "",
      "conditions": "",
      "source_url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.12445",
      "source_page": null,
      "source_excerpt": ""
    },
    {
      "claim_id": "claim-02",
      "statement": "Probes achieve 98.8% AUC on SHADE-Arena, surpassing an Opus 5.5 text-monitoring baseline, and up to 99.7% AUC distinguishing transcripts containing a model's true hidden goal from other goals.",
      "basis": "inferred",
      "result": "",
      "baseline": "",
      "conditions": "",
      "source_url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.12445",
      "source_page": null,
      "source_excerpt": ""
    }
  ],
  "exposure_map": [
    {
      "dimension": "quality",
      "basis": "not_evaluated",
      "finding": "",
      "interpretation": "",
      "limitation": "",
      "next_check": "",
      "source_url": "",
      "source_page": null,
      "source_excerpt": ""
    },
    {
      "dimension": "compute",
      "basis": "not_evaluated",
      "finding": "",
      "interpretation": "",
      "limitation": "",
      "next_check": "",
      "source_url": "",
      "source_page": null,
      "source_excerpt": ""
    },
    {
      "dimension": "latency",
      "basis": "not_evaluated",
      "finding": "",
      "interpretation": "",
      "limitation": "",
      "next_check": "",
      "source_url": "",
      "source_page": null,
      "source_excerpt": ""
    },
    {
      "dimension": "operations",
      "basis": "not_evaluated",
      "finding": "",
      "interpretation": "",
      "limitation": "",
      "next_check": "",
      "source_url": "",
      "source_page": null,
      "source_excerpt": ""
    },
    {
      "dimension": "compatibility",
      "basis": "not_evaluated",
      "finding": "",
      "interpretation": "",
      "limitation": "",
      "next_check": "",
      "source_url": "",
      "source_page": null,
      "source_excerpt": ""
    },
    {
      "dimension": "security",
      "basis": "not_evaluated",
      "finding": "",
      "interpretation": "",
      "limitation": "",
      "next_check": "",
      "source_url": "",
      "source_page": null,
      "source_excerpt": ""
    },
    {
      "dimension": "data_and_training",
      "basis": "not_evaluated",
      "finding": "",
      "interpretation": "",
      "limitation": "",
      "next_check": "",
      "source_url": "",
      "source_page": null,
      "source_excerpt": ""
    },
    {
      "dimension": "reproducibility",
      "basis": "not_evaluated",
      "finding": "",
      "interpretation": "",
      "limitation": "",
      "next_check": "",
      "source_url": "",
      "source_page": null,
      "source_excerpt": ""
    }
  ],
  "risks": [],
  "minimum_test": [],
  "open_questions": [],
  "independent_tests": [],
  "lab_reproductions": [],
  "report_available": false,
  "validation_tier": "unknown",
  "evidence_tier": "unknown",
  "infrastructure_basis": "unknown",
  "equations": [],
  "equations_status": "not_fetched",
  "core_kind": "",
  "equations_fetched_at": "",
  "equations_source_url": "",
  "equations_source_sha256": "",
  "exposures_reviewed_at": "",
  "exposures_source_sha256": ""
}