{ "schema_version": 1, "builder_plan": { "scenario": "A self-hosted assistant is too expensive because its model uses most of the GPU memory.", "change": "Try the paper's supported lower-precision weights on a copy of your serving setup.", "baseline": "The same model at its original precision, on the same GPU.", "steps": [ "Locate the paper's implementation and check its license, model support, data needs, and hardware requirements. Stop here if you cannot obtain the required artifacts.", "Save a small set of representative product tasks and expected outcomes. Keep evaluation tasks out of any training or tuning, and choose quality and cost limits before running.", "Run the baseline and the proposed change on identical inputs. Keep other settings fixed and repeat paired runs to expose variation.", "Save per-task outputs, failures, timings, and all usage costs. Review regressions before expanding the test." ], "measure": "Peak memory, task pass rate, latency, and total serving cost at the same context and load.", "decision": "Keep the change only if it meets your preselected quality and latency limits and improves the metric you care about after setup and operating costs. Otherwise retain the baseline. This is an exploration plan, not a validated recommendation." }, "builder_review": null, "arxiv_id": "2610.00382", "title": "On the Relationship between Model Quantization and Model Inversion Attacks", "summary": "It replaces standard post-training quantization with a bit-allocation and scale/rounding optimization scheme (Fisher-type sensitivity proxy, activation range calibration, task-recovery and geometry-retention objectives) designed to degrade model inversion attacks while preserving task accuracy. 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