{
  "schema_version": 1,
  "builder_plan": {
    "scenario": "An agent reads external documents or tool responses that may contain malicious instructions.",
    "change": "Replay attacks and legitimate lookalikes in an isolated copy of your agent workflow.",
    "baseline": "Your existing checks with the same tasks, permissions, and tool responses.",
    "steps": [
      "Locate the paper's implementation and check its license, model support, data needs, and hardware requirements. Stop here if you cannot obtain the required artifacts.",
      "Save a small set of representative product tasks and expected outcomes. Keep evaluation tasks out of any training or tuning, and choose quality and cost limits before running.",
      "Run the baseline and the proposed change on identical inputs. Keep other settings fixed and repeat paired runs to expose variation.",
      "Save per-task outputs, failures, timings, and all usage costs. Review regressions before expanding the test."
    ],
    "measure": "Successful attacks missed, legitimate actions blocked, detection delay, and review cost.",
    "decision": "Keep the change only if it meets your preselected quality and latency limits and improves the metric you care about after setup and operating costs. Otherwise retain the baseline. This is an exploration plan, not a validated recommendation."
  },
  "builder_review": null,
  "arxiv_id": "2609.31318",
  "title": "AgentXploit: Autonomous Repository-to-Runtime Red-Teaming for AI Agents",
  "summary": "AgentXploit replaces manual or single-agent security auditing of agent codebases with a two-role pipeline: an Analyzer traces attacker-controlled inputs to sensitive operations in the repository, and an Exploiter converts candidate paths into verified runtime attacks. It costs LLM inference tokens for two coordinated agents, requires white-box repository access plus a controlled runtime with an external verifier, and adds setup and maintenance complexity relative to running a general-purpose coding model. It can fail by missing attack paths the Analyzer does not trace, by exploiting benchmark-specific weaknesses that do not transfer to the reader's production system, and by reporting success only against its own verifier, which may not match real deployment defenses.",
  "rationale": "The method is directly relevant to anyone deploying tool-using agents and runs on API access alone, but its gains are demonstrated on a specific 72-vulnerability benchmark, so the reader must validate coverage and cost against their own codebase before adopting it as a pre-deployment gate.",
  "technique": "Two-role repository-to-runtime red-teaming of AI agents",
  "family": "seguranca_e_guardrails",
  "recommendation": "testar",
  "published": "2026-09-25",
  "as_of": "2026-10-18",
  "editorial_status": "indexed",
  "source_url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.31318",
  "independent_implementations": 0,
  "total_implementations": 1,
  "stars": 10,
  "citations": null,
  "claims": [
    {
      "claim_id": "claim-01",
      "statement": "AgentXploit replaces manual or single-agent security auditing of agent codebases with a two-role pipeline: an Analyzer traces attacker-controlled inputs to sensitive operations in the repository, and an Exploiter converts candidate paths into verified runtime attacks. It costs LLM inference tokens for two coordinated agents, requires white-box repository access plus a controlled runtime with an external verifier, and adds setup and maintenance complexity relative to running a general-purpose coding model. It can fail by missing attack paths the Analyzer does not trace, by exploiting benchmark-specific weaknesses that do not transfer to the reader's production system, and by reporting success only against its own verifier, which may not match real deployment defenses.",
      "basis": "inferred",
      "result": "",
      "baseline": "",
      "conditions": "",
      "source_url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.31318",
      "source_page": null,
      "source_excerpt": ""
    },
    {
      "claim_id": "claim-02",
      "statement": "59.3% end-to-end exploitation success across 72 benchmark vulnerabilities versus 38.4% for Codex (46.3% under a token-budget-matched comparison); on AgentDojo, 79.2% attack success versus 52.7% for AgentVigil.",
      "basis": "inferred",
      "result": "",
      "baseline": "",
      "conditions": "",
      "source_url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.31318",
      "source_page": null,
      "source_excerpt": ""
    }
  ],
  "exposure_map": [
    {
      "dimension": "quality",
      "basis": "not_evaluated",
      "finding": "",
      "interpretation": "",
      "limitation": "",
      "next_check": "",
      "source_url": "",
      "source_page": null,
      "source_excerpt": ""
    },
    {
      "dimension": "compute",
      "basis": "not_evaluated",
      "finding": "",
      "interpretation": "",
      "limitation": "",
      "next_check": "",
      "source_url": "",
      "source_page": null,
      "source_excerpt": ""
    },
    {
      "dimension": "latency",
      "basis": "not_evaluated",
      "finding": "",
      "interpretation": "",
      "limitation": "",
      "next_check": "",
      "source_url": "",
      "source_page": null,
      "source_excerpt": ""
    },
    {
      "dimension": "operations",
      "basis": "not_evaluated",
      "finding": "",
      "interpretation": "",
      "limitation": "",
      "next_check": "",
      "source_url": "",
      "source_page": null,
      "source_excerpt": ""
    },
    {
      "dimension": "compatibility",
      "basis": "not_evaluated",
      "finding": "",
      "interpretation": "",
      "limitation": "",
      "next_check": "",
      "source_url": "",
      "source_page": null,
      "source_excerpt": ""
    },
    {
      "dimension": "security",
      "basis": "not_evaluated",
      "finding": "",
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      "next_check": "",
      "source_url": "",
      "source_page": null,
      "source_excerpt": ""
    },
    {
      "dimension": "data_and_training",
      "basis": "not_evaluated",
      "finding": "",
      "interpretation": "",
      "limitation": "",
      "next_check": "",
      "source_url": "",
      "source_page": null,
      "source_excerpt": ""
    },
    {
      "dimension": "reproducibility",
      "basis": "not_evaluated",
      "finding": "",
      "interpretation": "",
      "limitation": "",
      "next_check": "",
      "source_url": "",
      "source_page": null,
      "source_excerpt": ""
    }
  ],
  "risks": [],
  "minimum_test": [],
  "open_questions": [],
  "independent_tests": [],
  "lab_reproductions": [],
  "report_available": false,
  "validation_tier": "unknown",
  "evidence_tier": "unknown",
  "infrastructure_basis": "unknown",
  "equations": [],
  "equations_status": "not_fetched",
  "core_kind": "",
  "equations_fetched_at": "",
  "equations_source_url": "",
  "equations_source_sha256": "",
  "exposures_reviewed_at": "",
  "exposures_source_sha256": ""
}