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Review regressions before expanding the test." ], "measure": "Successful attacks missed, legitimate actions blocked, detection delay, and review cost.", "decision": "Keep the change only if it meets your preselected quality and latency limits and improves the metric you care about after setup and operating costs. Otherwise retain the baseline. This is an exploration plan, not a validated recommendation." }, "builder_review": null, "arxiv_id": "2609.29808", "title": "Hard Stop: Kernel-Level Preemption and Containment for Rogue Agentic Execution", "summary": "The method replaces reliance on in-loop LLM guardrails and conventional sandboxing with a deterministic, out-of-band supervisory layer (discrete-event control plus synchronous-reactive sentinels) that preempts rogue agent actions at the kernel/POSIX level before off-target network calls execute. 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